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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND I 
LOAN CO~IP ANY, a Utah corpo-
ration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- I 
J. CLYDE HUNT and 
JESSE L. :McCABE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 9837 
RESPO·NDENT.'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATE11ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action is a suit on a promissory note and an 
appeal frmn the District Court's award of attorne'Ys fees 
to the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWE:R COURT 
The trial court at the request of the defendants' 
counsel, had two separate hearings. On the first hearing 
the court granted the plaintiff judgment for all sums due 
under the note. At the second hearing the court deter-
mined the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded the 
plaintiff's attorneys and entered jdugment therefor. The 
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appellant appealed only from the second judgment fixing 
the amount of attorneys fees. 
RELIEF SOUGH·T ON APPEAL 
The respondent opposes the position of the appellants 
and seeks a judgment of the appellate court sustaining 
the findings and judgment of the trial court. 
ST.ATEMEN1T OF F AOTS 
The plaintiff-respondent, hereinafter referred to as 
plaintiff, brought an action on a promissory note against 
the defendants-appellants, hereinafter refe·rred to as 
defendants, to recover the sum of $5,038.64, together 
with interest and attorneys fees. (R. 1.) The defendant, 
J. Clyde Hunt, filed an answer attacking the sufficiency 
of the complaint, denying liability on the note and deny-
ing the amount of attnrney's fees requested was reason-
able. In the prayer of Iris answer he asked for a deter-
mination of the indebtedness under t'he note and a de-
termination of the attorneys fees to be paid and asked 
the court to order a sale of the security for the note to 
be applied against the indebtedness found to be due. 
(R. 3) The security for the note was a vehicle, which 
vehicle had been removed from the State of Utah and in 
large part destroyed, so tlmt the plaintiff had, for all 
practical purposes, lost the security of the note. (R. 9, 
lines 22-30.) Subsequent to the filing of the action the 
defendant, Hunt, took possession of the remnants of the 
truck in Arizona on the theory that he could re·alize a 
better price instead of having the plaintiff attempt to 
recover the same and liquidate it to apply on the note. 
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The plaintiff waived its security with the consent of the 
defendant. (R. 9, lines 22-30, R. 10, lines 1-11.) The 
defendants stipulated in open court to treat the note as 
unsecured and to take over whatever fue defendant could 
salvage of the vehicle. 
"MR. HYDE: Well, as I understand it, they 
want to treat this as unsecured and take over the 
property and we are agreeable to that. 
THE COURT : Then the Court has no objec-
tion." (R. 10, lines 9-12.) 
Prior to the hearing of this matter the defendant 
J. Clyde Hunt, moved the court for an order determining 
the amount of attorneys fees to be paid to the plaintiff 
in the action ( R. 6) and a hearing on this motion and a 
motion of the plaintiff was heard on N ove,mber 9, 1962, 
at 10 :30 o'clock A.M. before the Honorable l\ierrill C. 
Faux. At the outset of the hearing the defendant's 
counsel announced to the court that they were: prepared 
to pay the amount due under the note and asked the 
court to determine and fix the amount of attorneys fees 
that the plaintiff was entitled to for the bringing of this 
action. 
"MR. PACE : * * * We are prepared to offer 
it to Court and tender to Court the total .amount 
of indebtedness due, your Honor, and we would 
like to have the Court determine the amount of 
attorney's fees due and this would probably then 
be the only issue before the Court. I only suggest 
-." (R. 9, lines 9-13.) 
"MR. HYDE: We will be, happy to have the 
ruling of the Court on the issue of attorney's fees 
in the matter." ( R. 9, lines 18-19.) 
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The plaintiff then, in order to establish the runount 
due under the note exclusive of attorney's fees for the 
bringing of the action, presented invoices to the court and 
to defendant's counsel in open court, which invoices were 
expenses incurred in the preservation and recovery of 
the security for the note and both counsel stipulated that 
the costs should be allowed, including some attorney's fees 
paid to lawyers in Arizona for preserving the security, 
but reserving for a future hearing the issue of what 
attorneys fees should be allowed to the plaintiff for the 
bringing of the suit on the note. It was revealed to 
plaintiff's counsel for the first time at the hearing that 
the defendant, Hunt, had acually truken possession of the 
vehicle and plaintiff's counsel framed the stipulation 
entered into between counsel setting forth that defend-
ant's counsel had agreed to pay all sums due under the 
note, together with the bills submitted to the court and 
counsel covering the costs of attempting to preserve the 
security in the State of Arizona and reserving only the 
issue of the amount of attorney's fees to he allowed the 
plaintiff for the bringing of the suit. It was agreed 
that the hearing on the attorney's fees would be a sepa-
rate matter to be heard at a later date. (R. 11, lines 22-
30, R. 12, lines 1-21.) Defendant's attorney agreed with 
the stipulation as framed: 
"MR. P ..ACE : Your Honor, Mr. Hyde has 
essentially stated the truth of our position. We 
are willing to pay the principal of the note, plus 
interest, plus the attorney's fees they had to 
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The court entered a judgment in accordance with 
the stipulation, reserving the issue of the amount of at-
torney's fees to be allowed the plaintiff for a subsequent 
hearing. (R. 67-68.) The court at a subsequent hearing 
on K ovember 23, 1962, pursuant to the stipulation that 
the court could hear the evidence and fix the attorney's 
fpes, made findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judg-
ment awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees. 
The statement of facts outlined in appellants' brief 
is not correct and while most of the statements made are 
not relevant to the issues we feel that these inaccuracies 
should be corrected. 
1. :Mr. I-Iunt was not an accommodation endorser 
but was a co-maker on the note with Jesse L. McCabe. 
2. The defendant, J. Clyde Hunt, did not learn of 
the default on the promissory note in September, 1962, 
as stated in appellants' brief. 1\Ir. Hunt met with the 
company attorney and with Mr. David Thomas, an em-
ployee of the plaintiff, in July, 1962, at which meeting 
:Mr. Hunt prmnised to bring the note current within 
seven days. (R. 51, lines 11-30.) He did not bring the 
payments current and the plaintiff referred the note to 
its attorney in August, 1962 for suit. (R. 53, lines 9-11.) 
Thereafter efforts were made to get Mr. Hunt to re-
write the note and bring the payments current but Mr. 
Hunt refused to do so, and left the office of the attorneys 
refusing to execute a new note or to bring the payments 
current. ~Ir. Hunt and his partner, Mr. Kartchner, stated 
to the company counsel that if the company did not' ac-
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cept a settlement on their terms the company might get 
nothing because an attorney had advised them that Mr. 
Hunt had a defense to the note. By reason of the re-
fusal of the defendant, Hunt, to cooperate in re-writing 
the loan the company was forced to file suit. (R. 45-47.) 
3. It is untrue that counsel refused to "extend to 
the defendant, J. Clyde Hunt, the papers necessary to 
retrieve the security." As the record will show, Mr. 
Hunt and Mr. Kartchner came into counsel's office, were 
extremely surley and stated, "There won't be any re-
writing of the note. We are not going to sign any other 
documents with reference to this matter.'' (R. 46.) 
4. The statement that counsel withdrew any offer 
of settlement after the answer was filed is not true. 
Efforts to settle the dispute were snnply not fruitful, the 
parties being unable to agree on the terms. 
5. The statement that the court wrongfully entered 
the judgment after an agreement had been 1nade that the 
judgment would only be entered if the check tendered 
into court did not clear, is untrue and unsupported by 
the record. It was agreed that as a courtesy to :Jir. Hunt 
the judgment would be held by the court until the court 
fixed the attorneys fees to be paid under the note and in 
the event the defendant paid all sums due the matter 
would be dismissed. The defendant refused to pay the 
sums due and the court thereupon, on N o;vember 23, 1962, 
entered the judgment of record as the parties had agreed. 
(R. 26.) The statement that the judgment was filed on 
the 16th day of November, 1962, is not true. The clerk's 
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stamp shows that the judginent dated the 16th day of 
Novembe'r, 1962, was held by the court pursuant to the 
agreement until the further hearing on November 23, 
1962, (R. 67) and the failure of the defendant to pay the 
sums ordered by the court to be paid resulted in the judg-
ment being filed after the last hearing on November 23, 
1962. 
6. The statement that the testimony showed that 
attorneys for the plaintiff spent only 1.1 hours on the 
case i,s false. The testimony of counsel, when called as a 
witness by the defendant, demonstrated that the case 
was received in the middle of August, 1962, and involved 
a number of very complex problems, including an action 
in the State of Arizona arising out of the theft of parts 
which were placed upon the truck, and that a great deal 
of time was spent on the suit between the middle of 
August and the end of N ove·mber when the matter was 
final1y concluded. (R. 37-60.) At the end of the testi-
mony with reference to what had been done in the· case 
Mr. Pace hi1nself stated "I think we could come to the 
conclusion, there is no question here but that Mr. Hyde 
is entitled to attorney's fees, I think I would stipulate 
to that." (R. 59, lines 29-30, R. 60, line 1.) The reference 
to the 1.1 hours undoubtedly arises from the memo-
randum of counsel introduced to show the date upon 
which the effort to settle the case took place. That con-
ference consumed 1.1 hours. It is difficult to see how 
counsel could be mislead into stating at page 14 of his 
brief that the testimony for the plaintiff "dedicated one 
and one-tenth hours (l-1/10) to this case" when the 
record clearly shows a great deal of time was involved 
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and a great many complicated issues and problems were 
involved, many of whieh were caused by the wrongful 
removal of the mortgaged property. 
ARGU:JIENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT - APPELLANT HAVING S'TIPU-
LATED IN THE LOWER COURT AS TO ALL ISSUES EX-
CEPT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE AL-
LOWED THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED 
TO RAISE THE ISSUES CONTAINED IN POINTS I, II AND 
IV OF HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
As set forth in our statement of facts above, defend-
ant's counsel stipulated that the defendant was liable on 
the note, agreed to pay the costs of preserving the se-
curity for the note and, in fact, agreed to the amount 
and form of the judgment signed by the court on the 16th 
day of November, 1962. (R. 67-68.) As set forth above 
in the statement of facts, defendant's counsel acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable 
attorneys fee at the first hearing and even after the sec-
ond hearing defendant's counsel acknowledged that the 
plaintiff was entitled to attorneys fees. 
"~IR. PACE: Well, Your Honor, I think 
there is the-I think we could come to the conclu-
sion, there is no question here but what :Mr. Hyde 
is entitled to attorney's fees, I think I zcould stipu-
late. to that." (Underscoring supplied) R. 59, lines 
28-30, R. 60, line 1.) 
Thus, defendant's counsel of his own motion asked 
the court to fi.-...: an attorneys fee for the plaintiff (R. 6), 
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acknowledged at the first hearing that the court should 
grant attorneys fees to the plaintiff (R. 12, lines 4-26, 
R. 13, lines 17-23, R. 15, lines 7-13), and as cited above, 
when the final hearing with reference to the mnount of 
attorneys fees was closed defendant-appellant's counsel 
stipulated that the plaintiff was entitled to attorneys 
fees and submitted the matter for the court to determine 
how much these attorneys fees should be. The court 
made its determination and entered separate findings 
and a separate judgment fixing the amount of the attor-
neys fees. (R. 69-72.) 
Point I of the appellant's brief is devoted solely to 
the point that the plaintiff did not properly pursue the 
security given for t!he note and, therefore, the court 
should not have entered judgment. This defense, if it 
ever could have been a defense, w.as certainly stipulated 
away at the hearings as set forth above. 
Point II of the appellant's brief complains that the 
court, after having signed the judgment as agreed by 
both counsel after the first hearing, subsequently filed 
the judgment of record. This action by the court was 
never objected to or appealed from and is not properly 
a point which the respondent should be required to re-
ply to since it was not raised as an issue either in the 
lower court by way of objection to the court's action or 
in the defendant's notice of appeal. 
Point IV of the appellant's brief is devoted to the 
theory that the defendant-appellant is entitled to a credit 
against the attorneys fees awarded to the plaintiff of 
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bills paid by the plaintiff to preserve and protect the 
security in the State of Arizona. These smns were spe-
cifically agreed to in open court as costs which the plain-
tiff should be entitled to and the court included them in 
the judgment entered on the 16th day of K ovember, 1962. 
"'The defendant, in open court, acknowledged 
liability under the note and agreed to pay the 
sum prayed for in the complaint, together with 
interest thereon, and in addition thereto the costs 
incident to the recovery and preservation of the 
mortgaged property in Arizona." (R. 67.) 
The parties further agreed that the only remaining 
issue in the suit to be determined was the amount of at-
torney's fees that should be allowed the plaintiff. 
"It was further agreed that the only remaining 
issue in the case was the runount of attorney's fees 
that should be allowed plaintiff's attorney for the 
bringing of this action." (R. 68.) 
The parties, having by stipulation in the lower court 
limited the remaining issues and having agreed on all 
other issues, should not be permitted to put in their 
briefs 1natte·r ·which does not relate to the only remain-
ing issue, to-wit, the reasonablness of the attorneys fees 
fixed by the lower court. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAL FROM THE 
JUDGMENT COMPLAINED OF IN POINTS I, II, AND IV 
AND THESE POINTS SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM AP-
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B.ule 73 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"The notice of appeal shall specify the par-
ties talking the appeal; shall designate the judg-
ment or part thereof appealed from;" (under-
scoring supplied) 
As heretofore stated in this memorandum, the court 
entered two separate judgments. One, on N ovemher 16, 
1962, which judgment incorporated the stipulated lia-
bility of the defendant in all respects except what attor-
neys fees should be assessed against the defendant in 
this action. (R. 67-68.) Two, on November 27, 1962, 
after a separate hearing, the court rendered a second 
judgment fixing and awarding the amount of attorney's 
fees that the plaintiff was entitled to have. (R. 72.) The 
defendant did not appeal fro1n the first judgment. The 
notice of appeal (R. 82) appeals only "from that judg-
ment detennining attorneys fees on a promissory note 
made to order of the plaintiff on ~fay 18, 1961, which 
said judgment was duly entered in the above entitled 
court on the 27th day of November, 1962." (R. 82.) The 
appellant does not appeal from the judgment of N ovem-
ber 16, 1962, and expressly limits his notice of appeal to 
the judgn1ent granting attorneys fees. 
In the case of Sierra Nevada Mill Co. 'V. Keith 
O'Brien Co., -!8 U. 12, 156 P. 943, the court, in dismissing 
the appellant's brief, laid down the rule as follows: 
"But the notice of appeal should itself so 
sufficiently describe and identify the judgment 
appealed from as to show what was intended with-
out resorting to the pleadings or the findings. 
Nor, since there is but one judgment, can it be said 
11 
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that the notice of appeal should be regarded as 
directed to that judgment~ That would but lead 
to a holding that, when there is but one judgment, 
no description of it in the notice of appeal is re-
quired, or that any misfit description is good. 
That is not what the atdhorit.ies teach. They are 
to the effect that the notice of appeal must suffi-
ciently describe the judgment or order appealed 
from so as to leave no doubt as tn its identity." 
Sierra Nevada Mill Co. 'li. Keith O'Brien Co., 48 
U.12, 156 P. 948, p. 946. 
It should be noted that in the above case there was 
not two judgments but only one and the court lleld that 
the failure to identify the single judgment specifically 
enough was fatal to the appeal. In this cas.e there are 
two judgments entered on separate dates and relating 
to separate matters as a result of separate hearings and 
the appellant has appealed only from the judgment re-
lating to the award of attorneys fees and not from the 
judgment which involved issues raised in Points I, II, 
and IV of appellant's brief. 
POINT III. 
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED BY 
THE OOURT WAS BASED UPON COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
AND WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION OF 
THE TRIAL COURT. 
The appellant, under Point III of his brief on appeal, 
argues that the attorneys fee to which the plaintiff was 
entitled is governed by Title 17, Chapter 37, Sec. 9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, because the note was secured by 
the vehicle. As pointed out in the statement of facts 
herein and Point I of the brief, the defendants' counsel 
12 
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in open court stipulated that his client would take over 
the remains of the truck which had been removed to the 
State of Arizona and largely destroyed, free and clear 
of the mortgage, and that the .action should proceed as 
an action on an unsecured note. 
"MR. HYDE: Well, as I understand it, they 
want to treat this as unsecured and take over the 
property and we are agreeable to that. 
"THE COURT: Then the court has no objec-
tion." (R. 10, lines 9-12.) 
It was contended by the defendant that his inter-
ests would he best served if he recovered the mortgaged 
property and disposed of it himself rather than subject 
it to foreclosure proceedings which the defendant be-
lieved would result in his realizing less value from the 
mortgaged property. Having so .agreed he should not be 
heard now to say that the plaintiff's action was not 
proper. The action was heard by the court at his request 
as an action on an unsecured note and the defendant and 
his counsel requested the court to hold a hearing for 
the purpose of establishing the amount of attorney's fees 
due the plaintiff under the note. (See, defendant's mo-
tion to determine the amount of attorney's fees, R. 6.) 
Also, the following oral motion of defendant's counsel : 
"MR. PACE: "* * * we would like to have the 
court determine the amount of attorney's fees due 
and this would pro hably then be the only issue 
before the Court. ***". (R. 9, lines 11-13.) 
"MR. HYDE : We will be happy to have the 
ruling of the court on the issue of attorney's fees 
in the matter." (R. 9, lines 18-19.) 
13 
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Having obtained the stipulation from the plaintiff 
that the defendant could take over the truck free and 
clear of the mortgage, which the defendant felt was to 
his advantage, Mr. Pace stipulated and requested that 
the court determine what attorneys fees should be al-
lowed the plaintiff and further stipulated that he ·would 
raise no issue as to whether or not the plaintiff was 
entitled to its attorneys fees. 
"MR. PACE: "* * * there is no question here 
but what Mr. Hyde is entitled to attorney's fees, 
I think I would stipulate to that." (Underscoring 
supplied) (R. 59, lines 29-30, R. 60, line 1.) 
The sole question properly raised on this appeal is 
whether or not the district judge, after conducting the 
hearing with reference to the amount of attorneys fees to 
be allowed the plaintiff, a:bused its discretion in awarding 
an attorney's fee in the amount of $1,443.10 in an action 
to recover the amount of $5,890.54 due under the promis-
sory note. 
The attorneys fee awarded by the court after taking 
evidence fr01n both parties with reference to the issue 
amounts to 24% of the judgment awarded to the plain-
tiff. The defendant called the plaintiff's attorney as his 
witness to describe the nature of the legal work per-
fornled in connection with the transaction involved in 
the suit and adduced facts indicating the complexity of 
the problems involved, most of which had been caused 
h;r the defendant's removal of the truck from the State 
of Utah and the dismantling of the truck, all of which 
resulted in actions being brought against the plaintiff 
14 
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in the State of Arizona arising out of the efforts of the 
plaintiff to recover the mortgaged property. Without 
detailing the record the testimony clearly shows that 
after the truck was removed to Arizona it was dismantled 
and parts converted from another ve·hicle were pl,aced 
upon it and as a result the repossession efforts of the 
plaintiff were frustrated and the plaintiff became in-
volved in a suit by the owner of the parts that had been 
placed on the truck. The court heard evidence with 
reference to what was done to recover and preserve the 
mortgaged property and the efforts to negotiate a settle-
ment of the account prior to suit and the work done in 
connection with the law suit. (R. 37-51.) 
It should be noted that at the trial of this issue the 
defendants did not put on any evidence whatsoever to 
contradict the evidence put on by the plaintiff with re-
spect to the reasonableness of the attorneys fees re-
quested and the court fixed the fee and found it to be 
reasonable in view of the evidence before the court. 
Counsel cites the case of McCormick v. Swem, 36 
U. 7, 102 P. 626, which case held that the reasonableness 
of the attorneys fees to be awarded is a discretionary 
matter with the trial court and we have no argument 
with the proposition that even where the amount of at-
torney's fees is agreed upon by the parties the court 
may intervene if it is unfair or unjust or unreasonable. 
This ease and the others cited in counsel's brief all sup-
port the position of the respondent that the question 
of attorneys fees is discretionary and should not be dis-
turbed by the appellate court unless it is apparent from 
15 
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the record that the trial court has abused its discretion 
1n finding what sum should properly be awarded. 
"The rule is established that, in fixing the 
fees of attorneys, the court is vested with a wide 
discretion and the court's award of an amount for 
such fees will be disturbed only when it is mani-
fest that there has been a palpable abuse of such 
discretion." City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles-
lnyo Farms Co., 25 P.2d 224, p. 227. 
CONCLUSION 
·The defendant-appellant stipulated to all issues in 
open court and moved the court to determine the amount 
of fees to be allowed the plaintiff. The appellant did 
not appeal from the judgment determining the amount 
due under the note and Points I, II, and IV raised on 
appeal should not be considered by the court. The award 
of attorneys fees was not an abuse of the discretion of 
the trial court in view of the evidence adduced at the 
hearing on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~IcBROO~f & HYDE 
401 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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